sustain organization (Morehouse, 1981: 491-492 ). In addition, the more homo geneous socio-economic backgrounds of legislators and lobbyists in amateur state legislatures should enhance the communality of their values and policy preferences.
The Arkansas General Assembly is classified as amateur (Henry, 1980: 111-112) . (Legislators prefer the term "citizen legislature." We follow standard nomenclature, although as our results will show, the legislators' term may be more descriptive.) The state's economy is agriculturally-oriented and homoge neous (Morehouse, 1981 : 513-514), one political party is overwhelmingly domi nant in state and local politics (Rosenthal, 1981: 140 ) and there are a small variety of interest groups which are rated as strong (English and Carroll, 1983; Whistler and Dunn, 1983) . Under the one-party circumstances of the Democrat party in Arkansas, state legislative politics become "no-party" politics. Ephem eral factions revolving around individual political and private groups inside and outside the General Assembly continue to be the modus operandi of Arkansas state legislative politics (Bass and DeVries, 1976: 87-89; Key, 1949: 186) . Under such circumstances, access and communications might be expected to be influenced by insider or outsider status within the configuration of factions.
In sum, American state legislators and lobbyists operate in an arena where their interactions can be mutually beneficial. They are elites who share a background o f similar social and economic experiences. In less economically diverse states -such as Arkansas -fewer interests exist to organize participa tion in legislators' electoral campaigns or in communicating interests' prefer ences to legislators. Access and communication might, then, be negatively affected.
Hypotheses/Expectations
For purposes o f hypothesis-testing, we anticipate that lobbyists who repre sent a small number o f organized groups important to Arkansas' socio-economic situation will form a set of "insiders" with respect to legislative access and communication. "Insider-lobbyists" should exhibit background characteristics that demonstrate more political experience, indicate a higher commitment to lobbying, and are similar to the legislators' backgrounds. They also should show greater understanding of what tactics are most effective in lobbying the General Assembly and, being integral to the legislative process, they should feel positive about their contributions to democracy. Finally, the "insider-lobbyists" should be more effective at getting desired results. We evaluate these expectations by:
1.the configuration of Arkansas interest groups perceived as strong (Table 1) (Table 14) .
The brief methodology section below describes our typology o f lobbyists. The "professional" designation is our measure of "insider-lobbyists" and "ama teur" is intended to index "outsiders" to the General Assem bly's legislative process.
Typology of Lobbyists
For the purpose of this study, lobbyists who are full-time employees of the organization will be called professionals. Conversely, amateurs are defined as unsalaried part-timers. We expect amateurs to be less politically experienced than professionals, to be less committed to lobbying, both occupationally and in a systemic sense, and to be less like their legislative counter-parts than profes sionals. An intermediate group which fits neatly into neither category is termed marginals. Marginals may be paid for their lobbying efforts, but work only on a part-time or occasional basis. Or, in some cases, they are unpaid, but devote full time to their lobbying efforts. 
Professionals

Findings
In Arkansas a limited number of interest groups are consistently identified as important in the General Assembly (English and Carroll, 1983: 45) . In our samples, there is considerable agreement among lobbyists and legislators (Table 1) that the Arkansas Education Association (AEA), financial institutions, utili ties, the state Highway Commission, and the Farm Bureau are the most "influen tial" organizations working in the General Assembly. While these groups correspond to the predominant economic structure of the state, the list is incom plete. The most likely explanation for this incompleteness is that important groups are active in the legislature only when their interests are challenged. Longitudinal data is needed to confirm this. Asterisks indicate mentions of less than 1 percent. We omitted those percentages that were less than 1 percent. Among legislators there were several other mentions of less than 1 percent resulting in the legislator column adding to less than 100 percent. Note: Lobbyists and legislators were permitted to list several "influential"interest groups; therefore, percentages do not add to 100%.
Professional and Amateur Lobbyists
The occasional anomalous citing of the Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) by lobbyists-neither of which is viewed positively nor as being particularly effec tive by legislators-suggests a pattern that will emerge more clearly as we progress through the study: that all types of lobbyists are rather sanguine concerning their influence.
The associations represented by lobbyists reveal considerable support for the expectation that groups important to an on-going economic system are most organized. Organizations employing "professionals" typically are banks, utili ties, local government and associations representing a particular industry. "Marginals" are likely to be officers of the organization they represent and are more likely to be representatives of non-profit groups. "Amateurs" are most inclined to represent issue-oriented, volunteer groups. (Specific group names are not listed to protect the confidentiality of the interviewees.)
Characteristics of Lobbyists
To examine shared affinities, we compared the lobbyists with legislators on three dimensions: gender, age, and educational background. 
Political Activity
Professionals are considerably more apt to be Democrats than are marginals or amateurs. Table 5 indicates that amateurs are more prone to identify them selves as Independents. Given the political party composition of the Arkansas General Assembly, a heavy Democrat preference among professionals would indicate an insider position in electoral politics. This expectation is confirmed at least tentatively by the data (Table 5) .
Furthermore, professionals appear to be involved in more political activi-
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ties than marginals or amateurs. *Scores ranged from 0-7. The activities are listed in Table 7 .
Some variation exists in the specific types o f political activity engaged in by the different classifications o f lobbyists. Perhaps the most significant revela tion of Table 7 is the rather high level o f activity by all categories o f lobbyists. This is not surprising given the elite status o f lobbyists and, o f course, their interest in the outcome o f state politics. Nonetheless, some differences do exist. Professionals are somewhat more likely to have contributed money to a political campaign than marginals and amateurs (although an overwhelming per centage of each group has done so). Also, professionals are considerably more inclined to have "raised campaign funds" than marginals and amateurs. This fits the mode of campaign financing in Arkansas General Assembly elections (Hil liard, 1983: 56-65) and suggests an insider position with regard to electoral politics. Amateurs are more likely to have sought public office than any other category, but professionals have a propensity to actually have held both public Donald E. Whistler and Charles DeWitt Dunn and party offices, suggesting an inside position in General Assembly electoral politics for professionals.
Given the very high Democratic parly identification of the professionals, it seems reasonable to assume that their previous political activities were on behalf of Democrat candidates, particularly at the state level. In light of their Demo cratic party affiliation and pattern of campaign contributions, we suspect, that the previous political activities of professionals are more on behalf of legislatorinsiders in the General Assembly. Perhaps marginals and amateurs may be more supportive of the electoral efforts of others who-like themselves-are "outsid ers". Finally, professionals are much more experienced in the legislative process than either marginals or amateurs (Table 8) . Over half of the professionals have eleven or more years experience compared to less than one-fourth and one-eighth of the other groups, respectively. Whether "years of experience" produces superior results in the lobbying process remains undetermined. Obviously, conventional wisdom would support such a hypothesis.
Commitment to Lobbying
Professionals are expected to maintain a much higher commitment to lobbying as a long-term personal (or occupational) goal. Table 9 displays that professionals are considerably more likely to expect to continue lobbying activi ties. Over 80 percent would continue lobbying even if employment with their present organization were to be ended. Professionals tend to view lobbying as being "healthy to democracy," while marginals and amateurs give the activity significantly lower value (Table 10) . Of course, it may be self-serving for professionals to congratulate themselves on their contributions to the "health of democracy". But beyond the human tendency toward self-aggrandizement, we suspect that the positive evaluation of lobbying results from the professionals' sense of involvement and satisfaction with the on-going process. Amateurs, on the other hand, may reject (or are more negative toward) a process in which they participate occasionally and in which they may be less successful in achieving their specific policy preferences.
Communication Techniques
Overall, lobbyists and legislators have very similar ratings o f which com munication techniques are most effective (Table 11) Another of our conceptualized communications dimensions is how lobby ing decisions/strategies are determined. Professional lobbyists differ somewhat from the other categories of lobbyists (Table 12 ). Lobbying strategy is largely determined in all cases through consultation, however, professionals are slightly more likely to implement strategies determined by others. Insofar as reporting requirements are concerned, professionals are somewhat more likely to report to a chief executive officer while amateurs are more inclined to report to a board or committee or, in some cases, to no one at all (see Table 13 ). This suggests that professional lobbyists represent larger, more permanent types of organizations. Amateurs appear to be more organizational entrepreneurs-those who have organized their own group and largely determine its goals and strategies. These are means. The range is 0-8.
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Insiders and Outsiders, So What?
The end result of our reasoning process is that "insiders" (professional lobbyists) should be the most effective at getting what they want. However, our data do not strongly support this. Table 14 shows the professionals are only somewhat more likely to rate their own effectiveness more highly than amateurs. While the difference in effectiveness is in the predicted direction, it is small.
Summary
We anticipated that the Arkansas agricultural economy would produce a limited number of interest groups from which professional lobbyists would have an "insider" advantage. Dividing lobbyists into professional (paid, full-timers), marginals (paid, but part-timers), and amateur (unpaid, part-timers), we find that professional lobbyists:
1. are more likely to represent an organization named as active in Arkansas politics and possessed of organizational resources known to be important for lobbying influence in a legislature; 2. share a closer affinity with legislators on education, age and gender; 3. are much more experienced, committed to lobbying as a vocation, and positive about the value of lobbying for a democracy; 4. are likely to be interwoven with the General Assembly's electoral politics outside the legislative process; 5. are more aware of what methods of communication are most effec tive in the legislative process; 6. determine legislative strategies in consultation with a board or committee or chief executive, while amateurs are organizational-entrepreneurs who "report" to themselves or represent a regional/national organization.
Our expectation that professional or "insider" lobbyists would be more effective than amateur or "outsider" lobbyists is not strongly supported. Profes sional lobbyists perceive themselves as only somewhat more effective than amateurs do (professional=6.2, amateur=5.7 on 8-point scale). Of course, this may be self-deception or self-serving careerism -to admit low effectiveness would reduce the need for one's services. However, the Arkansas General Assembly's norms and operations corroborate the lobbyists' self-perceptions.
Conclusions
Lobbyists of different ilks may perceive themselves as effective because the Arkansas General Assembly enacts most measures that are introduced,
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having the highest bill-passage rate of any American state legislature (Rosenthal, 258) . It operates upon the premise of enacting constituency-initiated matters that are not strongly opposed. This operating premise is consistent with a "citizen legislature" orientation, and provides for potentially widespread access and communication between citizens and state legislators.
